Can Domestic Institutions Explain Exchange Rate Regime Choice? The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions Reconsidered

Recent articles in International Organization and elsewhere have explored the role of domestic institutions in shaping exchange rate regime choice. These articles use some variation on the information reported by governments to the International Monetary Fund as their dependent variable. Even more recently, new data have become available that reflect actual (de facto) rather than declaratory (de jure) policies with respect to exchange rate regimes. The findings of the domestic institutionalists are significantly weakened, and in some cases reversed, when this more appropriate measure is used to test their claims. These tests cast doubt on whether a domestic institutional focus is the most fruitful way to study exchange rate regimes.Exchange rate choiche, Political Economy of Monetary Institutions

The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women’s Rights

Human rights treaty bodies have been frequently criticized as useless and the regime’s self-reporting procedure widely viewed as a whitewash. Yet very little research explores what, if any, influence this periodic review process has on governments’ implementation of and compliance with treaty obligations. We argue oversight committees may play an important role in improving rights on the ground by providing information for international and primarily domestic audiences. This paper examines the cumulative effects on women’s rights of self-reporting and oversight review, using original data on the history of state reporting to and review by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CmEDAW). Using a dynamic approach to study the effects of the periodic review process, we find that self-reporting has a significant positive effect on women’s rights. We explore three clusters of evidence for the domestic mobilization mechanism: information provision through domestic civil society organizations; publicity and critique through the domestic media; and parliamentary attention, debate, and implementation of recommendations. This is the first study to present positive evidence on the effects of self-reporting on rights and to describe the mechanisms that link Geneva bodies with local politics. Our findings challenge the received wisdom that the process of reporting to these treaty bodies is basically useless

The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation

The vast expansion of international nancial activity over the last decade has been a central fact of international economic life. Balance-of-payments statistics indicate that cross-border transactions in bonds and equities among the G-7 countries rose from less than 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1980 to over 140 percent in 1995. International bond and equity markets have reached staggering proportions: by the end of 1997, portfolio holdings of equity and long-term debt securities reached nearly $5.2 trillion. Capital ows to developing countries and countries in transition grew from$57 billion in 1990 to over $286 billion in 1997 before plummeting to$148 billion in 1998. Foreign exchange transactions reached an estimated average daily turnover of nearly $1.5 trillion in 1998 compared with a daily turnover of$590 billion in 1989. The annual turnover in derivatives contracts nancial agreements that derive their value from the performance of other assets, interest or currency exchange rates, or indexes was valued at $3.4 trillion in 1990. In 1998, trading and derivatives activities of seventy-one of the world's leading banks and securities firms totaled more than$130 trillion.Governmen

International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs

Why do sovereign governments make international legal commitments, and what effect does international law have on state behavior? Very little empirical research tries to answer these questions in a systematic way. This article examines patterns of commitment to and compliance with international monetary law. I consider the signal governments try to send by committing themselves through international legal commitments, and I argue that reputational concerns explain patterns of compliance.One of the most important findings is that governments commit to and comply with legal obligations if other countries in their region do so. Competitive market forces, rather than overt policy pressure from the International Monetary Fund, are the most likely "enforcement" mechanism. Legal commitment has an extremely positive effect on governments that have recently removed restrictive policies, which indicates a desire to reestablish a reputation for compliance.Governmen

International Borders: Yours, Mine, and Ours

International borders have become divisive issues in international and domestic politics. They have also become sites where the human rights of vulnerable persons have increasingly been documented as at risk. Policies of border hardening in the face of growing human mobility and other external threats—real and imagined—have made international borders focal sites of conflict at many levels. This Article argues that international law can reframe our understanding of bordering, leading to a more constructive approach to border management and greater respect for human rights. Borders are essentially institutions with the potential to settle coordination problems over territory. But of growing importance, they are also relational institutions that often have drastic effects on social and economic interactions. Their relational aspects require governance, for which international law has developed the law of neighborliness. In turn, the law of neighborliness requires, among other things, respect for mutually agreed covenants between sovereign states. Borders should not be presumed to pose inherent national security risks. Indeed, the presumption should be reversed: borders create zones where the need and obligation for friendly cooperation, including policies aimed at human rights protections, is at its highest

From Ratification to Compliance: Quantitative Evidence on the Spiral Model

Governmen

International Studies in the Global Information Age

The Global Information Age poses new and interesting questions for the study of international affairs. This Presidential Address surveys recent developments in commercialized and globalized information technologies that have and will continue to impact political and social relationships around the world. These new technologies affect power relationships among states, as well between states and civil society. They also present possibilities for new forms of global accountability and participation in governance. Finally, a range of technologies offer new and powerful ways to collect data for our research that allow us to ask new questions. President Simmons concludes as a result that exploratory empirical research is more enticing than ever before, but cautions that we should never think we can outsource the hard job of thinking to the very technologies that make innovative research possible in the first place.Governmen

Reflections on Mobilizing for Human Rights

Governmen

Should States Ratify Protocol? Process and Consequences of the Optional Protocol of the ICESCR

Proponents and opponents of ratification of the ICESCR‟s Optional Protocol have both exaggerated the consequences of giving individuals a “private right of standing” before the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. But this article argues that, on balance, ratification should be encouraged. Individuals will bring new and urgent issues to the international agenda, and the dialog will help to encourage a better sense of states‟ international legal obligations under the treaty. The consequences for ESC rights are likely to be modestly positive, if outcomes under the OP of the ICCPR are any guide. Even states that already respect ESC rights in their domestic law should ratify, because there is a tendency, judging by the ratification behaviour relating to similar agreements, for states to emulate ratification practices of other states in their region. Ratification will neither end deprivation nor damage the credibility of the international legal system. It will be a modest step forward in consensus-formation of the meaning of ESC rights, which in turn is a positive step toward their ultimate provision.Governmen